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COLLOQUIUM
A FURTHER COMMENT ON ROBERT P.
GEORGE'S "NATURAL LAW"
James E. Fleming*
In this further comment, I shall not undertake a rebuttal of
Professor George's many misinterpretations of my positions. For
example, George interprets me as suggesting that Roberts adopts the
first draft of Douglas's opinion in Griswold.' But I did not claim that
Douglas's first draft itself was a full justification for the right
recognized in Griswold or that the Supreme Court subsequently
adopted the precise argument of that draft. Rather, my claim was that
the personal liberty protected in Griswold can be justified on the basis
of freedom of intimate association and that the Court in Roberts
characterized it in those terms.2
A more pressing matter is not my positions, but George's, and a
problem that arises from his evident yet unacknowledged attempt to
wed natural law with Borkian legal positivism. I cannot see the sense
in which George's is a "natural law" reading of the Constitution.
George avoids claiming that the Constitution embodies simple or
natural justice or a just reading of due process, equal protection, and
other normative ideas. He says, in the fashion of a Borkian originalist,
that the Constitution embodies, and that judges and legislatures
therefore ought to apply, the framers' and ratifiers' views of justice,
due process, equal protection, and other constitutional ideas. Since he
cannot deny that the framers' views of these things can be morally
wrong, he is therefore saying that the Constitution embodies these
views even if they are morally wrong-that the meaning of the
Constitution does not turn on what is morally right or wrong. Now,
George may want to claim (I cannot be sure) that morality requires
that judges try to ignore moral questions when interpreting the
* This Colloquium began in a previous volume of Fordham Law Review. See Natural
Law Colloquium, 69 Fordham Law Review 2269-2312 (2001). This article is Professor
Fleming's Response to Professor Robert P. George's rebuttal in that volume.
1. Robert P. George, The Natural Law Due Process Philosophy. 69 Fordham L
Rev. 2301, 2310 (2001).
2. See James E. Fleming, Fidelity to Natural Law and Natural Rights in
Constitutional Interpretation, 69 Fordham L. Rev. 2285, 2289-90 (2001).
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Constitution and follow original understanding, as discovered
essentially by historical (not moral) inquiry. If so, he is making what
could loosely be called a "natural law" argument for a form of legal
positivism. In neither case is he defending a natural law theory of the
Constitution.
